Rudyard Kipling"
“When you're left wounded on Afganistan's plains and
the women come out to cut up what remains, Just roll to your rifle
and blow out your brains,
And go to your God like a soldier”
General Douglas MacArthur"
“We are not retreating. We are advancing in another direction.”
“It is fatal to enter any war without the will to win it.” “Old soldiers never die; they just fade away.
“The soldier, above all other people, prays for peace, for he must suffer and be the deepest wounds and scars of war.”
“May God have mercy upon my enemies, because I won't .” “The object of war is not to die for your country but to make the other bastard die for his.
“Nobody ever defended, there is only attack and attack and attack some more.
“It is foolish and wrong to mourn the men who died. Rather we should thank God that such men lived.
The Soldier stood and faced God
Which must always come to pass
He hoped his shoes were shining
Just as bright as his brass
"Step forward you Soldier,
How shall I deal with you?
Have you always turned the other cheek?
To My Church have you been true?"
"No, Lord, I guess I ain't
Because those of us who carry guns
Can't always be a saint."
I've had to work on Sundays
And at times my talk was tough,
And sometimes I've been violent,
Because the world is awfully rough.
But, I never took a penny
That wasn't mine to keep.
Though I worked a lot of overtime
When the bills got just too steep,
The Soldier squared his shoulders and said
And I never passed a cry for help
Though at times I shook with fear,
And sometimes, God forgive me,
I've wept unmanly tears.
I know I don't deserve a place
Among the people here.
They never wanted me around
Except to calm their fears.
If you've a place for me here,
Lord, It needn't be so grand,
I never expected or had too much,
But if you don't, I'll understand."
There was silence all around the throne
Where the saints had often trod
As the Soldier waited quietly,
For the judgment of his God.
"Step forward now, you Soldier,
You've borne your burden well.
Walk peacefully on Heaven's streets,
You've done your time in Hell."
The rise of Islamism can continue only if the economy weathers the demonstrations. ByDaniel Pipes
Rebellion has shaken Turkey since May 31.
Is it comparable to the Arab upheavals that have overthrown four rulers
since 2011; to Iran’s Green Movement of 2009, which led to an apparent reformer’s being elected president last week; or perhaps to Occupy Wall Street, which had negligible consequences? The
unrest marks a deeply important development with permanent
implications. Turkey has become a more open and liberal country, and its
leaders face democratic constraints as never before. But how much this
unrest will be able to change the role of Islam in Turkey depends
primarily on the economy.Material growth like China’s has been the main achievement of Recep
Tayyip Erdogan and the party he heads, the AKP. Personal income has more than doubled
in the decade that he has been in power, changing the face of the
country. As a visitor to Turkey since 1972, I have seen the impact of
this growth in almost every area of life, from what people eat to their
sense of Turkish identity.
That impressive growth explains the AKP’s increased share
of the national vote — from 34 percent (2002) to 46 percent (2007) to a
shade under 50 percent (2011). Turkey’s growth also explains how, after
90 years of the military’s serving as the ultimate political power, the
party was able to bring the armed forces to heel. At
the same time, two vulnerabilities that jeopardize Erdogan’s continued
domination of the government have become more evident, especially since
the June 2011 elections. The
first is dependence on foreign credit. To sustain consumer spending,
Turkish banks have borrowed heavily abroad, and especially from
supportive Sunni Muslim sources. The resulting current-account deficit
creates so great a need for credit that the private sector alone needs
to borrow $221 billion in 2013, or nearly 30 percent
of the country’s $775 billion GDP. Should the money stop flowing into
Turkey, the party (pun intended) is over, possibly causing the stock
market to collapse, the currency to plunge, and the economic miracle to
come to a screeching halt.
The
second is Erdogan’s sultan-like understanding of his democratic
mandate. The prime minister sees his election victories — especially the
one in 2011, when the AKP won half the popular vote — as carte blanche
to do whatever he pleases until the next vote. He indulges his personal
emotions (recall his confrontation with Shimon Peres
in 2009), meddles in the tiniest matters (his deciding the use of a
city park prompted the current turmoil), engages in social engineering (telling married couples to bear three or more children), involves Turkey in an unpopular foreign adventure (Syria), and demonizes
the half of the electorate that did not vote for him (calling them
beer-guzzlers who copulate in a mosque). This attitude has won the
fervent support of his once-downtrodden constituency, but also has wrought the fury
of the growing numbers of Turks who resent his authoritarianism, as
well as drawn the criticism of Europe’s leaders. German chancellor
Angela Merkel pronounced herself “appalled” by the recent police crackdown.
These
two weaknesses point to the importance of the economy for the future of
Erdogan, the AKP, and the country. Should Turkey’s finances weather the
demonstrations, the Islamist program that lies at the heart of the
AKP’s platform will continue to advance, if more cautiously. Perhaps
Erdogan himself will remain leader, becoming the country’s president
with newly enhanced powers next year; or perhaps his party will tire of
him and — as happened to Margaret Thatcher in 1990 — push him aside in
favor of someone who can carry out the same program without provoking so
much hostility. But
if “hot money” flees Turkey, if foreign investors go elsewhere, and if
Persian Gulf patrons cool on the AKP, then the demonstrations could end
AKP rule and rupture the drive toward Islamism and the application of
Islamic law. Infighting within the party, especially between Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul, or within the Islamist movement,
especially between the AKP and Fethullah Gulen’s powerful movement,
could weaken the Islamists. More profound, the many non-Islamist voters
who voted for the AKP’s sound economic stewardship might abandon the
party.
