Before
then, my “Sabahan” friends had been telling me how remote they felt
from the Malaysian mainland, and how the federal Malaysian government
seemed to think of their island as a mere resource-rich territory ripe
for exploitation (including the current thrust of tourism) rather than
as an integral part of the country. Well,
our exchange showed me that while, at that time, Sabahans felt at a
remove from the rest of Malaysia, neither were they ready to embrace (or
be embraced by) another “foreign” power, the Philippines. If I remember
right, at the time of my visit, there was even a nascent “Sabah
independence” movement airing a call for a separate, autonomous
republic. Now
comes news of the “visit” of a delegation of about 200 folks, including
100 armed escorts, headed by the “Crown Prince” of the Sultanate of
Sulu who sailed from Tawi-tawi and occupied a town hundreds of miles
from the Sabah capital, Kota Kinabalu.
The
latest news bulletins say there is a standoff between the sultanate’s
delegation and the Malaysian army, which has supposedly surrounded the
group. Both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the
Malaysian government have urged the “visitors” to return to the
Philippines. Historical
records leave no room for dispute. Sabah is indeed part of the
Sultanate of Sulu, and the presence of large numbers of Tausug (the
dominant ethnic group in Sulu-Tawi-tawi) in Sabah itself is testament to
how they consider the territory part of the neighborhood. (Tawi-tawi is
less than an hour’s boat ride away.)
Modern
history and regional power politics, however, frustrated the
sultanate’s authority over the area. The sultanate leased out Sabah to
the British North Borneo Company in 1878, and the company itself later
transferred the territory to Malaysia in 1963. The
Philippine government has, from time to time, resurrected the “Sabah
claim,” usually in a bid to win leverage in regional competitions for
power. By far the most serious attempt took place under the first Marcos
administration, before the proclamation of martial law, with the
so-called “Jabidah massacre.”
A
top-secret operation had apparently been launched to prepare Filipino
Muslim soldiers to raid Sabah and take over the reins of government. A
training camp was set up on Corregidor Island, but the operation’s cover
was blown after a trainee escaped and told then opposition Sen. Ninoy
Aquino about the secret training camp, including the horrendous
conditions under which some of his comrades had died. The “Jabidah
massacre” exposé was to land Aquino at the top of Marcos’ list of
enemies. Later
administrations chose to take a more low-key position regarding the
claim over Sabah, but the claim never did disappear completely.
Still,
the action of the delegation from Sulu, especially their “field trip”
to Sabah, came as a surprise to many, including the Philippine
government. The
trip raises many questions, questions which government and DFA
spokespeople have not really addressed adequately. For one thing, how
could an armed group of at least 100 “security forces” gather in
Tawi-tawi and board a flotilla of boats sailing toward Sabah without
triggering the usual alarm bells? Was
there a failure of intelligence when the heirs of the sultanate
gathered and discussed the need to make their presence felt in Sabah?
Did not our various authorities, including Sulu’s local leaders, know
about the extent of the sultanate heirs’ sense of betrayal and how they
felt “ignored” in the course of the peace process with the Moro National
Liberation Front and Moro Islamic Liberation Front?
Indeed,
my suspicions are raised. The latest news before this “excursion” to
Sabah was how MNLF forces had been going after elements of the Abu
Sayyaf in Sulu, supposedly as part of the effort to free the bandit
group’s remaining hostages. Could this have been part of an effort to
distract local authorities as the sultanate’s heirs prepared to pay a
visit to Sabah, including gathering their security forces and their
arms? The biggest mystery, however, is the full extent of the sultanate’s plans beyond landing in Sabah.
That
they chose to land in a small town hundreds of miles from the capital
but occupied by sympathizers, may be proof of their intent to build a
bigger force perhaps to march onto Kota Kinabalu. But
did they really think they could land on Sabah’s shores and lay claim
to the island without arousing suspicion or provoking a response from
Malaysian authorities? Could this speak of a fatal hubris on the part of
the sultanate’s heirs, if not carelessness in their planning and
tactics?
At
some point in the simmering dispute over Sabah, there was a proposal to
bring the Philippine claim for arbitration before an international
body. I don’t know what has happened to this suggestion, but I suspect
things have moved far beyond a territorial dispute for a simple
solution.
Perhaps
we should start talking not just to Malaysians but to Sabahans as well.
Perhaps their interests will jibe fittingly with ours, leading to a win
(Philippines)-win (the Sultanate of Sulu)-win (Sabahans)-win (Malaysia)
solution that will finally bring an end to this festering issue. Hat tip: Lt Col Idris Hassan
