12 December, 1963.
At 21.30 hours, about 10 men in jungle hat and olive green uniforms with round white insignia on left sleeve, raided a shop and stole foodstuffs. A patrol of Security Forces found enemy observation post and a camp estimated for about 100 men in the area on the north side of SUNGAI SERUDONG. The enemy observation post overlooked Security Force Platoon position on the south side of the river. Footprints were found only in camp. The raiders also stole the shop owner’s radio and kidnapped two Muruts who later escaped. Enemy whereabouts were not known. It was possible that they were on the move.

Image: Our Enemy!! Click on image to enlarge. Image from Will Fowler's Britain's Secret War.

15 December, 1963.
The village of KALABAKAN is situated on a river approximately 30 miles northwest of TAWAU and 12 miles north of the Indonesian Border. On the 29 December, 1963, Security Forces (SF) positions in this area were:

(a) One Police Field Force post wired in and sand-bagged, holding fifteen policemen.
(b) One temporary Military post consistng of two huts with trenches along side one hut. This post held No. 1 platoon, two sections of No. 10 platoon and C Company Commander of 3rd Royal Malay Regiment. This position was not wired in. These posts were 400 yards apart sited on a hillside overlooking the track and river. The enemy force believed to be about 130 moved from a camp in KALIMANTAN in mid-December, 1963; visited SERUDONG on 21 December, 1963 and after raiding a shop moved to SELIMPOPON. On 26 December, 1963, they shot a boar at TERAKAN and then moved to TECK GUAN’S timber camp near KALABAKAN where they rested during the night 28/ 29 December. The enemy force comprised the following detachments :

(a) Nl Det. Led by BENNY (a sergeant of the Korps Komando Operasi--Indonesian Marine Commandos) and Hendrik (a member of the Sukarelawan-‘Volunteers of the North Kalimantan Revolutionary Army'). (The Sukarelawan were trained by the KKO at Nunakan in November/December, 1963). Nl’s objectives were Tawau, Lahad Datu and Semporna. It had eight KKO members in its ranks. Its strength is 45-50.
(b) N2 Det. Led by Wayang (later killed) had a strength of approximately 37 men which included 15 members of the KKO. Its objectives were Tawau and Semporna.
(C) WI Det. Led by Lasani (killed later) had a strength of about 34 men. Its objective was Sandakan.
(d) W2. Led by Buronto(a KKO Sgt.) had a strength of about 30 men. This group was also heading for Sandakan.

The enemy attack developed from two axis. The first group moved along the high ground to the NORTH and worked down the ridge on which the Malay position was sighted. They fired bursts of small arms fire into the two huts of 3rd Royal MALAY, followed by throwing grenades, which accounted for the majority of the Security Force Casualties. Firing at this position commenced at 20.55 hours and ended at 23.00 hours (approx.) A section left at the top of the ridge, moved down the west shoulder rifling houses as they went, chiefly for loot and food.

The second group moved off the ridge, went NORTH of the police station and attacked the police station at 21.05 hours until 23.00 hours. The police corporal had managed to get 19 Home Guard and police into the compound before the attack developed. The enemy threw grenades at and over the wire and attempted to scale the wire fence. Malay or Murut voices could be heard guiding them.

At about 22.30 hours some of the enemy stopped a civilian land-rover which was being driven into KALABAKAN. The local labourers in the vehicle failed to debus quickly enough and the enemy opened fire, killing one and wounding another. The enemy kidnapped three of the occupants of this vehicle and made use of them as guides.

Subsequently found enemy documents confirm that one enemy was killed and four wounded. Security Forces suffered eight killed (including the Malay Company Commander, a Major) and 19 soldiers wounded. One civilian was killed and one wounded. The enemy instructed the local guides to take them to BERENTTAN (about IO miles NE of KALABAKAN) through the jungle, Three of the wounded enemy were instructed to return to NUNAKAN but their uniforms were first removed. At this time the enemy had large quantities of rice-presumably part of the food taken from the shops in KALABAKAN and morale was high but discipline was beginning to slack off.

Immediately after the KALABAKAN attack, Security Forces were reinforced to carry out ‘follow-up’ operations. The first contact was at 00.45 hours on 30 December, when Security Forces moving up the KALABAKAN river intercepted an enemy "perahu" (boat). The enemy escaped on being challenged but a quantity of enemy documents and equipment were recovered.

Enemy plans to infiltrate and attack targets further into the interior of SABAH were disrupted by Security Forces operations. The enemy also suffered from a shortage of food and their knowledge of the area in which they were operating was limited. Enemy casualties by 10 February, 1964, amounted to:
29 killed,
22 surrendered,
33 captured,
which included the following KKO casualties:
8 surrendered,
1 killed,
2 captured.

Direct Indonesian involvement has been confirmed from captured personnel, documents and equipment. The INDONESIAN authorities instructed the force to live off the land once they were in MALAYSlAN territory and also get their food supplies from shops in the many small villages by purchase or even looting. But this was made impracticable by Security Forces operations, so much so that the enemy were forced to try and withdraw to KALIMANTAN. Interrogation of captured/ surrendered enemy personnel and recovery of enemy documents and equipment immediately after the KALABAKAN raid have brought to light the following:

((1) Eleven KKO (KORPS KOMANDO OPERAST-INDONESIAN MARINE COMMANDOS) eliminated--one killed, two captured and eight surrendered. Interrogation of the captured and surrendered KKO indicates that about 31 members of the KKO took part in this enemy operation-the incursion into TAWAU Residency and the attack on KALABAKAN.
(2) Enemy weapons recovered were FN rifles, FN LMGs, 50 MM mortars, bombs and grenades. Most of these had the INDONESIAN Army Ordnance stamp on them.
(3) Enemy clothing and equipment recovered also shows that the enemy force was equipped with INDONESIAN Army kit. This kit was a mixture of that issued to TNI and KKO.

31 December, 1963.
10 TNKU (TENTERA NASIONAL KALIMANTAN UTARA or the NATlONAL ARMY OF NORTH KALIMANTAN) were seen in the West Brigade area at 15.00 hours on 31 December. A Security Forces follow-up was launched. On I January, 1964, at 15.00 hours a further follow-up by a small patrol of Security Forces and trackers contacted the enemy at GR 904034 estimated to be 75 strong. The Security Forces took up defensive position and were attacked three times before making a tactical withdrawal. A Security Forces corporal was killed and his body was recovered. Five enemy were killed, but bodies were not recovered. The following were found near the area of contact which appeared to be used as ammunition dump :

(I) 1 armalite rifle and ammunition.
(2) 1 X 3.5 inch rocket launcher and rockets.
(3) 1 x 2 inch Czech rocket launcher and grenade.
(4) 12 sticks of plastic explosives.
(5) 1 .45 Colt Revolver.
(6) 1 large pack and fighting order note book, containing diagrams of BAU and KROKONG.

1 January, 1964.
Security Forces destroyed an enemy Machine-gun post astride the border at 15.30 hours. On 1 January, 1964, in the region of BA KELALAN two enemy were killed and two others wounded. There were no Security Force casualties.